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Abstract
We propose a method to conceal data on a physical layer of the OSI reference model by
disturbing them with some random noises, and moreover, a method to restore the concealed
data to the original ones by using the noise filtering based on a proper stochastic filtering
theory. Our concealing-restoring system manages the data from the data link layer of the
OSI reference model. Although we introduced a linear concealing-restoring system in our
previous work, we study its nonlinearization and improve the security of the concealing-
restoring system in this paper.
1 Introduction
The recent cutting-edge technologies have been enabling us to develop microdeveices for the
Internet of Things (IoT) interfaces, in particular, including the brain-computer interface (BCI)/
brain-machine interface (BMI). Many vigorous studies have been continuing for their individual
implementations in the important reality. For instance, amazingly, a French team succeeded in
controlling an exoskeleton by brain signals of a tetraplegic patient through an epidural wireless
BMI [2]. It is a natural enough fear that someone hacks into some embedding type medical
devices and hijacks them. The fear may be beginning to become a reality. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that we can tamper a cardiac pacemaker device from
remote place by radiocommunication [9]. Besides this, two scientists gave us a demonstration of
hacking a live jellyfish and controlling its neural signals, that is, they equipped the jellyfish with
microchips and electrodes to improve its swimming pace [32]. We should establish the security
in the microdevices [4]. In addition to those security problems for the embedding type medical
devices, for instance, some problems for the drone, the flying IoT system in our real life, arise:
the hijack of the drone operation, and the exploitation of data on it. Namely, we should mind
that someone can tap and steal signals between a drone and its user. We are interested in the
security for data such as the signals in the implementation space having too small arithmetic
capacity to install an encryption technology.
Our target scenes requiring the security include countermeasures for the firmware attack and
side-chanel attack in a low layer of the computer architecture. The firmware attack bypasses some
softwares for antivirus and encryption on the higher-layer, and infects the lower-layer data in
a device [3, 5, 6, 19]. The side-channel attack bypasses the cryptographic technique based on
mathematical complexity and taps the cryptographic key [16, 17, 18, 26, 29]. Several sorts of side-
channel attacks have been proposed, and many new side-channel attacks have been presented
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[7, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 33]. In particular, CacheBleed [34] and TLBleed [10] have come
under the industrial spotlight from the point of view of computer architecture.
Keeping in mind those instances, we propose the (nonlinear) concealing-restoring system
for the data on the physical layer of the OSI reference model. Here, OSI is the abbreviation
of the open systems interconnection, and the OSI reference model consists of 7 layers: the
physical layer, the data link layer, the network layer, the transport layer, the session layer, the
presentation layer, and the application layer from the lowest to the highest layer [13]. Thus, our
data are signals. We maintain the safety of the data in a device over a proper period of time
by installing the (nonlinear) concealing-restoring system on the data link layer. The data link
layer is situated between the physical layer and the network layer, and administers and controls
the relation between those two layers. The data concealing is performed by using the random
noise disturbance, and the noise is generated in the device. The data restoring is achieved by
the noise filtering. The introduction of the noise disturbance and the noise filtering are based
on a proper stochastic filtering theory [1]. We showed its prototype which is the easiest and
simplest concealing-restoring system [8]. In this paper, we report how we can change the sort of
the noise disturbance and the noise filtering to improve the security by the nonlinearity of the
concealing-restoring system.
2 Mathematical Set-Ups
Our concealing-restoring system for data Xt, t ∈ R, is mathematically described by of a simul-
taneous equation system (SES):
Fi(X
i
t , X˙
i
t , U
i
t ,W
1,i
t ) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (2.1)
Xi+1t = fi(X
i
t ,W
2,i
t ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (2.2)
UN+1t = fN+1
(
XN+1t
)
, (2.3)
where X˙it stands for the differential of X
i
t , i.e., X˙
i
t = dX
i
t/dt. We keep the composition of the
SES secret to use it as a secret key, which is known only by those who conceal the original data
Xt and restore their concealed data. In this paper, we suppose that they are Alice and Bob,
Alice conceals the data, and Bob restores the concealed data to the original data. In this SES,
each functional Fi makes a stochastic differential equation (SDE), and each map fi determines
a form of the linear or nonlinear equation. We assume the map fi(·, w) : x 7→ fi(x,w) is bijective
in the following sense, and call it bijection in this paper. When we regard w as a parameter
and fix it, the map fi(·, w) : x 7→ y = fi(x,w) is mathematically injective and surjective. That
is, there is an inverse map f−1i (·, w) such that x = f−1i (y, w). The nonlinearity means that
the linearity in the following sense is broken. We say that the map f is linear if the property,
f(a1~x1 + a2~x2) = f(a1~x1) + f(a2~x2), holds for arbitrary vectors ~xj = (xj , wj) and constants aj ,
j = 1, 2. We used linear bijections for the prototype [8].
For the initial data of the SES, we use our original data Xt which we hide. We keep the
forms of functionals Fi and bijections fi secret to use them as secret keys known only by Alice
and Bob. We prepare 2N random noises W j,it , j = 1, 2; i = 1, 2, · · · , N , for the SDEs. We
introduce the noise disturbance by the SDEs given by Eq.(2.1) for the stochastic processes Xit ,
i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and amplify the disturbance by Eqs.(2.2) and (2.3) in our concealing-restoring
system. We can also use the means, variances, and distributions of the random noises as secret
keys. In the concealing-restoring system, we make N + 1 concealed data from the original data
Xt. The concealed data are U
i
t , i = 1, 2, · · · , N,N + 1, in SES. The data restoration is achieved
by a proper noise filtering. Based on a proper stochastic filtering theory, we remove the random
2
noises from every concealed data U it , and we estimate the data X
i
t . In this paper, we denote the
estimate by X̂it , and call it estimated data for the data X
i
t . The last estimate X̂
1
t is our desired
restoration of the original data Xt. We denote it by X̂t.
In the OSI reference model, the physical layer conducts the transformation between signals
and binary data, and the data link layer administers and controls the relation between the
physical layer and the network layer. Thus, we intend to set our (nonlinear) concealing-restoring
system on the data link layer, and handles the signals on the physical layer. The signals are our
data Xt. Thus, we need to make the signal Xt from binary data. To simplify our explanation,
in accordance with the low/high-signal method, we represent ‘low’ by ‘0’ and ‘high’ by ‘1’.
Concatenating n+1 bits, a0, a1, · · · , an ∈ {0, 1}, we have a binary word, a0a1 · · · an. So, obtaining
the data Xt, t ∈ R, from the binary word, a0a1 · · · an, we use the linear interpolation as a simple
digital-analogue (D/A) transformation in the following. First, we define Xi by
Xi =
{
+1 if ai = 1,
−1 if ai = 0,
i = 0, 1, · · · , n.
Next, we connect the adjacent data, Xi and Xi+1, with a straight line for each i = 0, 1, · · · , n−1.
Then, we obtain the polygonal line Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ n. This signal Xt is the data from the binary word
a0a1 · · · an. We call Xt a binary pulse in this paper. Making the restoration of the binary word
from the binary pulse, we use the simple analogue-digital (A/D) transformation. We explain a
method of how to seek the character âi ∈ {0, 1} for each i = 0, 1, · · · , n, and how to make a word
â0â1 · · · ân for the original word a0a1 · · · an. This is to make the explanation simple in this paper.
First of all, we need to determine a threshold between ‘low’ and ‘high’ of signals in advance by
taking into account the mean and variance of the random noises when used for concealing data.
We can use the threshold as a secret key between Alice and Bob. For each i = 0, 1, · · · , n, we
define the character âi by
âi =
{
1 if X̂i > threshold,
0 if X̂i ≤ threshold.
Concatenating the bits, â0, â1, · · · , ân. we obtain a binary word, â0â1 · · · ân. We call the binary
word â0â1 · · · ân the restored word from X̂t.
In this paper, we introduce the nonlinearity into our concealing-restoring system using the
following nonlinear function g. One of examples is g(x) = x3. Before defining another function
g, we define a function h on the interval [0, 1] by
h(x) =

x+ 0.75 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.25,
x+ 0.25 if 0.25 < x ≤ 0.5,
x− 0.25 if 0.5 < x ≤ 0.75,
x− 0.75 if 0.75 < x ≤ 1.
Let Xmin and Xmax be the minimum and maximum of the range of the data input into the
function g. We define the function g by
g(x) = h
(
x−Xmin
Xmax −Xmin
)
. (2.4)
Because we use the function g as our secret key, we obtain many candidates and several kinds
of secret keys by altering the definition of the function h.
3
3 Methods of Concealing & Restoring
In this section, we briefly explain how to conceal the data Xt and how to restore the concealed
data U it to the restoration X̂t.
3.1 How to Conceal Data
We make a loop of repetition in the ascending order of the parameter i using Eqs.(2.1) and (2.2).
To enter the loop, we think the original data Xt our initial data of SES, and put
X1t = Xt.
At the first step of repetition, we input the initial data X1t into Eq.(2.1) with the noise W
1,1
t ,
and have the SDE,
F1(X
1
t , X˙
1
t , U
1
t ,W
1,1
t ) = 0.
Seek U1t in the above, and we obtain a concealed data U
1
t . Eq.(2.2) gives us the data,
X2t = f1(X
1
t ,W
2,1
t ),
for the next step. We input the data X2t into Eq.(2.1) with the noise W
1,2
t , and have the next
SDE,
F2(X
2
t , X˙
2
t , U
2
t ,W
1,2
t ) = 0.
We then obtain the concealed data U2t . We repeat the same procedure, and obtain the concealed
data, U1t , U
2
t , · · · , UNt , and hide the data, X1t , X2t , · · · , XNt , with the random noise disturbance.
At the last step of the repetition, we input the concealed data XNt into Eq.(2.2) and obtain the
data XN+1t . Exiting the loop of repetition, we input the data X
N+1
t into Eq.(2.3). We finally
obtain the last concealed data UN+1t . In this way, we create the sequence of the concealed data,
U1t , U
2
t , · · · , UNt , UN+1t .
3.2 How to Restore Data
Since we assume that the nonlinear map fN+1 in Eq.(2.3) is bijective, we can restore the con-
cealed data UN+1t to the data X
N+1
t by its inverse map f
−1
N+1 as
XN+1t = f
−1
N+1
(
UN+1t
)
.
We substantially start up the data restoring from the data XN+1t , and use a certain noise
filtering. To accomplish the noise filtering, we must find a proper stochastic filtering theory or
invent a new one. In that stochastic filtering theory, Eqs.(2.1) and (2.2) should play roles of the
state equation and the observation equation, respectively.
The restoring system consists of the loop of the following repetition in the descending order
of the parameter i . We enter the loop with the data XN+1t . At the first step of the repetition,
we input the above XN+1t into Eq.(2.2), and the concealed data U
N
t into Eq.(2.1). We then have
simultaneous equations to seek the data XNt ,
FN (X
N
t , X˙
N
t , U
N
t ,W
1,N
t ) = 0,
XN+1t = fN (X
N
t ,W
2,N
t ).
Although we cannot completely reproduce the original random noises, W 1,Nt and W
2,N
t , we know
their means, variances, and distributions as secret keys. Thus, we can estimate the stochastic
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process XNt with the help of the proper stochastic filtering theory. We then obtain the estimated
data X̂Nt for the data X
N
t . Inputting the estimated data X̂
N
t into the slot of X
N
t of Eq.(2.2),
and the concealed data UN−1t into Eq.(2.1), we reach simultaneous equations to seek the data
XN−1t ,
FN−1(XN−1t , X˙
N−1
t , U
N−1
t ,W
1,N−1
t ) = 0,
X̂Nt = fN−1(X
N−1
t ,W
2,N−1
t ). (3.1)
In the same way as in the above, the stochastic filtering theory gives us the next estimated data
X̂N−1t . We repeat this procedure, and obtain the estimated data, X̂Nt , X̂
N−1
t , · · · , X̂2t , X̂1t , by
turns, and we pick up the last estimate X̂1t . This is the restoration X̂t of the original data Xt.
3.3 Small Schemes
We here make some remarks on two small technical schemes. We prepare bijective, nonlinear
functions, gi, of one variable, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N . We assume that Alice and Bob know the concrete
form of the functions, gi, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N , and its inverse functions. So, they can use them as
secret keys.
Even in the case where the functionals, Fi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , are linear, we can nonlinearlize
the concealed data, U it , directly. That is, we use the SDE,
Fi(X
i
t , X˙
i
t , g
−1
i (U
i
t ),W
1,i
t ) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (3.2)
instead of Eq.(2.1). Since Bob knows the secret keys, gi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , he can immediately
compute the data g−1i (U
i
t ). We think that this method is almost simplest to make the nonlin-
earization of the concealed data and to reduce computing power for the restoring system. This
is the first scheme.
The second scheme is that we employ the function gi to define each map fi by
fi(x, y) = gi(cix+ y), i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (3.3)
where ci is a constant, and we have Eq.(2.2) as
Xi+1t = fi(X
i
t ,W
2,i
t ) = gi(ciX
i
t +W
2,i
t ).
We now define the data Y it by
Y it = g
−1
i−1(X
i
t), i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (3.4)
Namely, we define the data Y it so that we have X
i
t = gi−1(Y it ). Then, we can rewrite Eqs.(2.1)
and (2.2) as
Fi(gi−1(Y it ), dgi−1(Y
i
t )/dt, U
i
t ,W
1,i
t ) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (3.5)
Y i+1t = c
igi−1(Y it ) +W
2,i
t , i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (3.6)
Even if the functionals, Fi, are linear, people who do not know the keys, gi, i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1,
think that Eqs.(3.5) and (3.6) make a nonlinear system for the data Y it . However, Alice and Bob
know the secret keys. Therefore, they can transform Eq.(3.5) to the linear SDE,
Fi(X
i
t , X˙
i
t , U
i
t ,W
1,i
t ) = 0,
for the data Xit . Moreover, they have the equation
Xi+1t = gi(ciX
i
t +W
2,i
t )
from Eq.(3.6), and are not puzzled by the nonlinearity in the equation because they can easily
handle the nonlinearity of the secret key gi.
5
4 Examples: The Simplest SES & Its Implementation
Regarding how to determine each of functionals, Fi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and bijections, fi, i =
1, 2, · · · , N,N + 1, its any definition is fine so long as a noise filtering (and thus, stochas-
tic filtering theory) is established for the restoring system. To restore the concealed data,
U1t , U
2
t , · · · , UNt , UN+1t , generally speaking, we must know the concrete forms of the functionals
and bijections, and the noise filtering. Even though they are originally supposed to be in secret
and hidden from public, we gave an example of them to explain the method of our concealing-
restoring systems, and showed its implementation [8]. We review the example in this section.
Although we did not show the algorithms for the implementation in our previous paper, we will
show them and apply to several sorts of data.
4.1 Examples of Functionals and Bijections
We prepare functions Ai(t), vi(t) and non-zero constants biu, b
i. Here vi(t) can be a random
noise. In this case, we suppose that the distribution of the random noise is given by N(0, σ2v),
the normal distribution whose mean and standard deviation are respectively 0 and σv. We define
each functional Fi such that it makes a SDE,
dXit =
(
Ai (t)− 1)Xitdt+ biuU itdt+ bivi(t)dt− biudBit, (4.1)
for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N . That is,
X˙it =
(
Ai (t)− 1)Xit + biuU it + bivi(t)− biuW 1,it . (4.2)
We suppose that W 1,it and W
2,i
t are Gaussian white noises whose mean m
j,i and variance V j,i are
respectively 0 and (σij)
2. Bit is the Brownian motion given by W
1,i
t = dB
i
t/dt, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . We
assume that the noises W 1,it and W
2,i
t are independent for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N , but the noises
W 2,it , i = 1, 2, · · · , N , are not always independent. For simplicity, we employ linear functions of
two variables ~x = (x, y) for bijections, f1, · · · , fN : fi(~x) = cix+ y, where ci, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , are
nonzero constants. Then, Eqs.(2.2) become
Xi+1t = fi(X
i
t ,W
2,i
t ) = c
iXit +W
2,i
t , i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (4.3)
Since Eqs.(4.1) and (4.3) make a linear system and respectively play the roles of the state
equation and observation equation in the stochastic filtering theory, we can employ the linear
Kalman filtering theory [1, 11, 14, 15] for our noise filtering. At the end of SES, we introduce
the nonlinearity into the concealed data UN+1t by
fN+1(x) = x
3 (4.4)
through Eq.(2.3) in this paper.
4.2 Discrete Version of Kalman Filtering
We seek the restoration X̂t by numerical analysis. Thus, we discretize Eq.(2.1); we approximate
the differential by the forward difference,
dXit
dt
≈ X
i
t+∆t −Xit
∆t
,
for t = k∆t with k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Employing ∆t as a unit, the differential is approximated as
dXit/dt ≈ Xik+1 −Xik for k = 1, 2, · · · , and therefore, Eq.(4.1) is discretized as
Xik+1 = A
i
kX
i
k + b
i
uU
i
k + b
ivik − biuW 1,ik
6
for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Here we respectively denote Ai(k) and vi(k) by Aik and by vik. With
this discretization, Eqs.(4.3) and (2.3) respectively become
Xi+1k = c
iXik +W
2,i
k , i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
UN+1k = fN+1
(
XN+1k
)
=
(
XN+1k
)3
. (4.5)
In addition to this concealed data UN+1k , we can give the other concealed data U
i
k, i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
by
U ik =
1
biu
{
Xik+1 −AikXik − bivik
}
+W 1,ik , (4.6)
using Eq.(4.2). Though we did not describe the algorithm to create the concealed data in our
previous paper [8], it is in Alg.1.
Algorithm 1 Concealing Data Xt
Determine secret keys, Aik, b
i
u, b
i, ci;mj,i, σij .
Determine a common key, vik.
Define white noises, W j,ik , j = 1, 2; i = 1, 2, · · · , N , with the individual mean mj,i and
variance (σij)
2.
Determine N , how many SDEs you want.
Determine n, how many data you handle.
for k = 0, 1, · · · , n do
Set X1k := Xk
end for
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do
for k = 0, 1, · · · , n do
Set U ik := (b
i
u)
−1 {Xik+1 −AikXik − bivik}+W 1,ik
Set Xi+1k := c
iXik +W
2,i
k
end for
end for
for k = 0, 1, · · · , n do
Set UN+1k := f(X
N+1
k )
end for
Conversely, we can estimate the data, XNk , X
N−1
k , · · · , X1k , from the concealed data, UNk ,
UN−1k , · · · , U1k , using the linear Kalman filtering theory [1, 11, 14, 15]. We can make an algorithm
to obtain the estimated data, X̂Nk , X̂
N−1
k , · · · , X̂1k , in the following. We denote the priori estimate
by X̂−,ik , the variance by P
i
k, the priori variance by P
−,i
k , and the Kalman gain by g
i
k for each
i = N,N −1, · · · , 1. We repeat the procedure consisting of ‘Prediction Step’ and ‘Filtering Step’
from i = N to i = 1. We note that in the Kalman filtering theory the estimate X̂k represents
an optimal estimate, and is called the posteriori estimate.
Before entering the loop for the Kalman filtering, we prepare the concealed data X̂N+1k by
X̂N+1k = f
−1
N+1
(
UN+1k
)
= 3
√
UN+1k , k = 0, 1, · · · , n.
‘Prediction Step’ and ‘Filtering Step’ of the linear Kalman filtering are as follows:
Prediction Step:
X̂−,ik = A
i
kX̂
i
k−1 + b
i
uU
i
k−1 + b
ivik−1,
P−,ik = (A
i
k)
2P ik−1 + (σ
i
1)
2(biu)
2.
7
Filtering Step:
gik =
ciP−,ik
(ci)2P−,ik + (σ
i
2)
2
,
X̂ik = X̂
−,i
k + g
i
k
(
X̂i+1k − ciX̂−,ik
)
,
P ik =
(
1− cigik
)
P−,ik .
X̂−,i0 , P
i
0, g
N+1
0 , and X̂
i
0.
Although the algorithm to restore the concealed data was not described in our previous
paper [8], it is given in Alg.2.
Algorithm 2 Restoration from Concealed Data U it , i = 1, 2, · · · , N,N + 1
Get secret keys, Aik, b
i
u, b
i, ci;mj,i, σij .
Get the common key, vik.
Obtain the concealed data, U ik.
for k = 0, 1, · · · , n do
Set X̂N+1k := f
−1(UN+1k )
end for
for i = N,N − 1, · · · , 0 do
Determine initial values, X̂−,i0 , P
i
0, g
i
0, X̂
i
0.
for k = 1, 2, · · · , n do
Set X̂−,ik := A
i
kX̂
i
k−1 + b
i
uU
i
k−1 + b
ivik−1
Set P−,ik := (A
i
k)
2P ik−1 + (σ
i
1)
2(biu)
2
Set gik := c
iP−,ik {(ci)2P−,ik + (σi2)2}−1
Set X̂ik := X̂
−,i
k + g
i
k(X̂
i+1
k − ciX̂−,ik )
Set P ik := (1− cigik)P−,ik
end for
end for
for k = 0, 1, · · · , n do
Set X̂k := X̂
1
k
end for
4.3 Application to Binary Word
In this subsection, we apply Alg.1 and Alg.2 to binary words. We make Eqs.(4.1), (4.3), and
(2.3) for N = 2 with Ai(t) = 0.1 (constant function), bi = 1, biu = 1, and c
i = 1 for each i = 1, 2.
We define a function vi(t) as the random noise obtained by the linear interpolation based on
a normal random number with N(0, 12). We assume that the mean of white noises are all 0.
The standard deviation of the white noise W j,1t is σ
1
j = 0.1, and that of the white noise W
j,2
t is
σ2j = 1. The length of the word a0a1 · · · an is 100, and thus, n = 99.
Our original word a1a2 · · · a99 is given by Eq.(4.7). We here note that we do not use the
character a0 and remove it because we cannot estimate the first bit in our concealing-restoring
system.
10011110110000111001100010111001010100101101110011
0011010001011000010101101111101110000111111111110 (4.7)
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Then, we get its binary pulse Xt as in Fig.1. Following Alg.1, we make the concealed data,
Figure 1: The binary pulse Xt transformed from the original word (4.7).
U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t . Their graphs are in Figs.2. We realize that there is a slight difference between
U3t and others, U
1
t and U
2
t . This difference is caused by the nonlinearity induced by Eq.(4.4).
Following Alg.2, we obtain the restoration X̂t as in Fig.3. Let us take 0 as the threshold. Then,
we obtain the restored word â1â2 · · · â99 made from the restoration X̂t, which is the same as in
Eq.(4.7).
The graphs in Figs.2 say that the concealed data, U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t , are merely analogue data.
Assume that a wiretapper becomes aware that the concealed data are for digital data and knows
our A/D transformation in some way. Then, he/she gets a binary word from the concealed data
as follows:
10011110010000110101000010111001010111101101000100
00010101010110100110010011101111000001000111100000
for U1t ,
10011110010001110101101110111101001110011101001100
10010101011010000100011011101011001001001110101000
for U2t , and
00001011100000101100010101001010100000010110110000
01001100001111000010001000010101100101001110011110
for U3t . Here, since the wiretapper does not know that we remove the first bit, individual con-
cealed data U it make the word consisting of 100 characters. Their graphs and difference from the
original binary pulse are in Figs.4
9
Figure 2: The concealed data for the binary pulse Xt in Fig.1: U
1
t , U
2
t , and U
3
t from the top.
10
Figure 3: The top is the original binary pulse Xt, and the bottom is its restoration X̂t.
11
Figure 4: The individual graphs of the concealed data, U1t , U2t , and U3t , from the top.
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4.4 Application to Digital Pictorial Image
In this subsection, we apply Alg.1 and Alg.2 to digital pictorial images. We use binary data
of a digital pictorial image in the ORL Database of Faces, an archive of AT&T Laboratories
Cambridge [28]. The data have the greyscale value of 256 gradations (8bit/pixel). We set our
parameters: A = Ai = 0.1, b = bi = 1, bu = b
i
u = 1, c = c
i = 1, σ1 = σ
i
1 = 0.1, and
σ2 = σ
i
2 = 1. We determine the function v
i(t) as the same noise in §4.3 with σv = 2. The
original pictorial image and its binary pulse Xt are obtained as in Figs.5. Here, the upper bound
of t is 92 × 112 = 10304 and t runs over [0, 10304]. We obtain the concealed data U1t and U2t
Figure 5: The original pictorial image (left) with the digital data, and its binary pulse Xt (right) only for
t ∈ [0, 200].
by Eq.(4.6), and the concealed data U3t by Eq.(4.5) as in Figs.6. We realize that there is a
remarkable difference between U3t and others, U
1
t and U
2
t , in Figs.6. This difference is caused by
the nonlinearity induced by Eq.(4.4), and suggests us that we should also adopt some nonlinearity
in the functionals in Eq.(2.1). In the next section, actually, we introduce the nonlinearity into
the individual concealed data by Eq.(2.4) as well as Eq.(4.4).
We are interested in how much we can restore the concealed data to the original pictorial
image. We assume that a wiretapper unfortunately steals one of U1t , U
2
t , U
3
t , and tries to get a
pictorial image from it without the noise filtering. Then, he/she must basically know our A/D
transformation since the concealed data, U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t , are analogue as in Figs.6. We suppose
that, in the OSI reference model, this transformation is done for the data on the physical layer,
and is handled from the data link layer. Our transformation from the digital data to a pictorial
image should be done on an upper layer of the OSI reference model. We moreover assume that the
13
Figure 6: The concealed data U it for the binary pulse Xt in Fig.5 obtained by the linear concealing system: U1t ,
U2t , . U
3
t from the top. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
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wiretapper succeeds in stealing the former transformation from the data link layer and the latter
from the upper layer. Then, he/she gets the individual pictorial images of the concealed data,
U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t , as in Figs.7. He/she somewhat finds the faint contour of the face by the light
(white) and shade (black) in the pictorial images for the concealed data U1t and U
2
t . However,
the faint contour fade away in the pictorial image for the concealed data U3t , which results from
the nonlinearity. Actually, this fade-away can be controlled by the kind of nonlinearity.
Figure 7: The individual pictorial images obtained by the concealed data, U1t , U2t , and U3t from the left.
Following the restoring system in Alg.2, the restoration X̂t and the restored pictorial image
from it are in Figs.8 and 9.
15
Figure 8: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.5, and the bottom is the restoration X̂t obtained by Alg.2.
Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
Figure 9: The left is the original pictorial image in Fig.5, and the right is the pictorial image obtained from the
restoration X̂t in Fig.8.
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4.5 Application to Analogue Data of Pictorial Image
We use analogue data of a pictorial image in the Olivetti faces database [27], where the data of
pictorial images are transformed to analogue data from the original ones in the ORL Database
of Faces, an archive of AT&T Laboratories Cambridge [28]. The data have the greyscale value
of 256 gradations (8bit/pixel). Our parameters are A = Ai = 0.1, b = bi = 1, bu = b
i
u = 1,
c = ci = 1, σ1 = σ
i
1 = 0.1, and σ2 = σ
i
2 = 1 again. We also use the common key v
i(t) in the
same way as in §4.4 with σv = 2. The original analogue data Xt and their pictorial image are in
Figs.10. Here, the upper bound of t is 64 × 64 = 4096 and t runs over [0, 4096]. The concealed
Figure 10: The original pictorial image (left) with the analog data Xt (right). Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
data U1t and U
2
t by Eq.(4.6), and the concealed data U
3
t by Eq.(4.5) are in Figs.11. There is a
remarkable difference between U3t and others, U
1
t and U
2
t , which is caused by the nonlinearity
induced by Eq.(4.4). This difference is visualized; we assume that a wiretapper becomes aware
our method to make a pictorial image from analogue data, then he/she gets pictorial images from
the concealed data U it , i = 1, 2, 3, as in Fig.12. The restoration X̂t and the restored pictorial
image from it are in Figs.13 and 14.
5 Improvement by Nonlinearity
In this section, we use one of schemes in §3.3 to improve the (linear) concealing-restoring system
in the previous section by introducing a nonlinearity. We hide the details of the concrete algo-
rithms of how to introduce the nonlinearity into the data concealing and how to make the noise
filtering in the data restoring because they are vital for the secret keys in our concealing-restoring
17
Figure 11: The concealed data U it for the binary pulse Xt in Fig.10 obtained by the linear concealing system:
U1t , U
2
t , . U
3
t from the top. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
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Figure 12: The individual pictorial images obtained by the concealed data: U1t , U2t , and U3t from the top.
19
Figure 13: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.5, and the bottom is the restoration X̂t obtained by Alg.2.
Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
Figure 14: The left is the original pictorial image in Fig.10, and the right is the pictorial image obtained from
the restoration X̂t in Fig.13.
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system below. However, the way to that nonlinearity is paved with the scheme in §3.3 substan-
tially. That is, in the data concealing, we basically make the nonlinearity using the nonlinear
function in Section 2 and the scheme in §3.3. Thus, we only show the results in this section.
As an example of the nonlinearity in this section, we use the function g defined by Eq.(2.4),
and put gi = g, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , for the scheme. Namely, we introduce the nonlinearity into the
concealed data, U1t , U
2
t , · · · , UNt , by Eq.(2.4), and into the concealed data, UN+1t , by Eq.(4.4). In
this section, we employ the particle filtering [1] instead of the linear Kalman filtering in Section
4 for the data restoring.
We conceal the original data in Section 4 using the concealing system with the nonlinearity.
To compare the results by the restoring system with the particle filter and the results by the
restoring system with the linear Kalman filter in Section 4, we first try to restore the concealed
data by the latter, and show how we fail in restoring. We next show the results by the former
to cope with the nonlinearity.
5.1 Application to Binary Word
Our original word a1a2 · · · a99 is given by Eq.(4.7). We obtain its binary pulse Xt as in Fig.1.
Following the method of the concealing system with the nonlinearity, we can make the concealed
data, U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t . Their graphs are in Figs.15. If we depend on the linear system in Section
4 to restore the concealed data, we obtain the data X̂t as in Fig.16, which says that we fail
in recovering the original data Xt. We can visually realize this failure. Let us take 0 as the
threshold. Then, using our own transformations from the signal to the binary word, we obtain
the word â1â2 · · · â99 from the data X̂t as
11100001101101001010110001010110000000110010111011
0111101011000101100111110001000011111011100001111,
but it is different from the original binary word in Eq.(4.7). We, for example, suppose that a
wiretapper steals the concealed data, U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t . If he/she does not know our noise filtering
to cope with the nonlinearity, then he/she feels difficulty to recover the original data Xt from
the concealed data.
We know the proper noise filtering and how to use it. We follow the method of the data
restoring in §3.2 together with the particle filtering. Then, we obtain the restoration X̂t as
in Fig.17, which completely recover the original binary word in Eq.(4.7). How to combine the
particle filtering with the data restoring in §3.2 should be the top secrecy.
5.2 Application to Digital Pictorial Image
In this subsection, we use the binary data of a digital pictorial image already used in §4.4. We
use the concealing system with the nonlinearity, and then, obtain the concealed data, U1t , U
2
t ,
and U3t , as in Figs.18.
We indeed have the data X̂t as in Fig.19 using the linear system in Section 4, but we fail in
recovering the original data Xt from the data X̂t. We can make this failure visible by making its
pictorial image. Applying our A/D transformation and the transformation from the binary data
to the pictorial image, we can create a pictorial image from the data X̂t by force, and then, we
have it as in Fig.20.
To cope with the nonlinearity introduced in the concealing system, in the same way as in
the previous subsection, we use the noise filtering based on the particle filtering theory in the
restoring system. Then, we obtain the restoration X̂t as in Fig.21. We can recover the original
pictorial image from the restoration as in Fig.22.
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Figure 15: The concealed data for the binary pulse Xt in Fig.1: U
1
t , U
2
t , and U
3
t from the top.
22
Figure 16: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.1, and the bottom is the data X̂t obtained by Alg.2.
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Figure 17: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.1, and the bottom is the restoration X̂t obtained by the
restoring system with the nonlinearity.
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Figure 18: The concealed data for the original binary pulse Xt in Fig.5 using the concealing system with the
nonlinearity: U1t , U
2
t , and U
3
t from the top. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
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Figure 19: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.5, and the bottom is the data X̂t obtained by the restoring
system with Alg.2. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
Figure 20: The original pictorial image in Fig.5 (left) and the pictorial image from X̂t in Fig.20 (right).
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Figure 21: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.5, and the bottom is the restoration X̂t obtained by the
restoring system with the nonlinearity. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
Figure 22: The left is the original pictorial image in Fig.5, and the right is the recovered pictorial image from
X̂t.
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5.3 Application to Analogue Data of Pictorial Image
We use the signal of the analogue pictorial image already used in §4.5. However, the technique
that we use here is almost same as in the previous subsection. Following the concealing system
with the nonlinearity, we conceal the original data Xt, and obtain the concealed data, U
1
t , U
2
t ,
and U3t , as in Fig.23.
The restoring system in Section 4 without taking care of the nonlinearity produces the data
X̂t from the concealed data, U
1
t , U
2
t , and U
3
t . The data X̂t is in Fig.24. If we force to get the
pictorial image from these data X̂t in the same way as in §4.5, then we have it as in Fig.25. We
realize that we fail in recovering the original signal Xt and its pictorial image.
Using the particle filtering theory in the restoring system, we obtain the restoration X̂t as
in Fig.26. We can recover the original pictorial image from the restoration X̂t as in Fig.27.
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Figure 23: The concealed data U it for the binary pulse Xt in Fig.10 obtained by the concealing system with the
nonlinearity: U1t , U
2
t , . U
3
t from the top. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
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Figure 24: The top is the original pulse Xt in Fig.10, and the bottom is the data X̂t obtained by the restoring
system with Alg.2. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
Figure 25: The left is the original pictorial image in Fig.10, and the right is the pictorial image from X̂t in
Fig.24.
30
Figure 26: The top it the original pulse Xt in Fig.10, and the bottom is the restoration X̂t obtained by the
restoring system with the nonlinearity. Here t ∈ [0, 200] only.
Figure 27: The left is the original pictorial image in Fig.10, and the right is the recovered pictorial image from
X̂t in Fig.26.
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6 Conclusion
We have proposed a concealing-restoring system for the data on the physical layer of the OSI
reference model. In this concealing-restoring system, we conceal the data by using random noise
disturbance, and restore the concealed data by using the noise filtering. We moreover study its
nonlinear version to improve the security.
Making our own SES and finding our own stochastic filtering theory, we have our own
concealing-restoring system for the data on the physical layer of the OSI reference model. We
are planning to install our concealing-restoring data in Arduino boards [20].
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